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Abstract: 
   
Purpose: This paper examines the impact of diversification on bank performance and the 
role of block shareholders in this relationship. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Dynamic GMM estimation is applied to test the research 
hypotheses on the sample of 21 Vietnamese commercial banks during the 2009-2018 period. 
Bank performance is measured by profitability and risks, whereas diversification is 
measured by income diversification, non-interest income diversification and non-interest 
income share. The presence of block shareholders is measured by ownership ratio and a 
dummy variable with 10% ownership threshold. 
Findings: Income diversification enhances bank performance, whereas non-interest income 
share has a reverse impact. State block shareholders help amplify the positive influence of 
diversification on bank performance, meanwhile the roles of foreign and private block 
shareholders remain ambiguous.  
Practical implications: Increased non-interest income share may adversely impact 
diversification. Vietnam should loosen the private and foreign ownership for banks so as to 
benefit more from diversification. 
Originality/Value: The paper contributes to the literature in three main ways. Firstly, it adds 
empirical evidence to the effects of diversification on bank performance in a transitional 
economy. Secondly, this paper provides evidence for the impact of block shareholders on the 
relationship between diversification and bank performance in the context of privatization and 
increasing presence of foreign investors. Thirdly, the article adds empirical evidence to the 
impact of other factors on bank performance after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. 
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Competitive pressure and deregulation in the banking industry have spurred 
financial institutions to break out of the confinement of traditional practices and to 
shift into fields that yield non-interest income, including fees and commission 
services, bancassurance and off-balance sheet activities (Lepetit et al., 2008). There 
have been many studies concerning the impact of diversification on bank 
performance in terms of profitability and risks (Thalassinos and Kiriazidis, 2003). 
The positive influence of diversification on bank performance has been empirically 
proven through studies by, inter alia, Baele et al. (2007), Lee et al. (2014), Moudud-
Ul-Huq et al. (2018) and Doan et al. (2018). However, a number of empirical 
experiences show a negative relationship between diversification and bank 
performance, such as Berger et al. (2010) and Fang et al. (2011). 
 
While the relationship between diversification and bank performance is a common 
research topic, research on the impact of ownership structure on this relationship 
remains scarce (Doan et al., 2018). Diversification is one type of corporate 
strategies, and thus, the influence of block shareholders on banks’ attitudes towards 
risk acceptance has been theoretically ratified. Saghi-Zedek (2016) discovered a 
difference in diversification activity between banks with and without controlling 
shareholders. Berger et al. (2010) drew a comparison between diversification 
activity of foreign shareholders with that of domestic shareholders (including both 
state and private shareholders). Doan et al. (2018) contributed to previous empirical 
evidence with findings for an increasing effect of income diversification on 
performance and an adverse effect of non-interest income on performance. In 
addition, state-owned banks are less effective at income diversification, while 
foreign-owned banks in developing countries are more effective at diversification. 
 
The transition from planned to market economy in Vietnam may have created a 
favorable case for research on the correlation between diversification and bank 
performance, as well as for research on the role of block shareholders in this 
relationship.  
 
After the 2007 – 2009 global financial crisis, banks in Vietnam introduced changes 
in governance, most notably the ownership ratio threshold for block shareholders 
(The Law on Credit Institutions of Vietnam, 2010), or to be more precise, 5% for 
private shareholders, 15% for organizational shareholders, except for state 
shareholders in state-owned banks and foreign shareholders in fully foreign-owned 
banks. To a certain extent, these changes may significantly influence banks’ 
diversification activity and block shareholders’ impact on this activity.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature as follows. Firstly, it adds empirical evidence 
to the effects of diversification on bank performance in a transitional economy. Bank 
performance is examined based on two aspects: profitability and risks; whereas 
diversification is considered in the form of proxy income diversification, non-
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interest income diversification and non-interest income share. Secondly, this paper 
provides evidence for the influence of block shareholders on the relationship 
between diversification and bank performance in the context of privatization and 
increasing presence of foreign investors. The ownership threshold for block 
shareholders in this research is 10%, as the 20% threshold adopted in past studies 
(for instance, La Porta et al., 1999; Doan et al., 2018) is not suitable for bank 
ownership structure practices in Vietnam. Thirdly, the paper adds empirical evidence 
to the effect of bank-specific factors and macroeconomic factors on bank 
performance in a transitional economy after the 2007-2009 global financial crisis.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 the author briefly surveys 
the existing literature, highlighting the impact of diversification on bank 
performance and the influence of block shareholders on this relationship. Section 3 
presents research methods, including research hypothesis development, data, model 
and research variables description, as well as data estimation methods. Research 
results and discussion are detailed in Section 4, conclusion and policy implications 
in Section 5. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Evidence 
 
2.1 Diversification and Bank Performance 
 
According to Lepetit et al. (2008), competitive pressure and deregulation encourage 
financial institutions to focus on non-interest income, including fee-based and 
commission services activities, bancassurance and off-balance sheet activities. 
Diversification may have a direct influence on bank performance through the 
difference in profit margin from income and non-income activities, or indirectly 
through various diversification level of each bank regarding these two activities. 
 
Baele et al. (2007) debated that diversification served to help banks achieve 
economies of scope and operating synergy. Financial conglomerates might achieve 
economies of information by providing an array of services for the same customer. 
On the other hand, the complexity of diversification intensified interest conflicts 
between banks and customers and among departments providing different services. 
 
Diversification of investment categories reduces risks owing to the low correlation 
between income sources and their asynchronous periodic patterns (Batten and Vo, 
2016). Froot and Stein (1998) concluded that diversification served to prevent 
default risks and abate financial exhaustion. Diversification affects bank profits and 
stability, as well as diminishes risks and financial exhaustion (Berger et al., 1999; 
Baele et al., 2007). By diversifying, banks earn less interest income and 
simultaneously minimize credit risks and interest rate risks (Pennathur et al., 2012). 
Diversification benefits financial institutions by reducing regulatory costs, 
improving performance and efficient application of governance skills (Boyd and 
Prescott, 1986; Drucker and Puri, 2009).  
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On the contrary, some studies suggest that non-traditional income diversification 
increases income volatility. DeYoung and Roland’s (2001) analysis covered a range 
of topics, from the fierce competition in non-interest practices and fixed costs to fee-
based services and lack of regulations on non-interest activities. According to Stiroh 
(2004), Stiroh and Rumble (2006), the strong correlation between non-interest and 
interest income may emerge from cross-selling different bank products to the same 
customer. 
 
Thus, even though the impact of diversification on improving bank performance and 
reducing risks is theoretically supported, empirical evidence shows diverse results, 
which can be accounted for by the differences in financial innovation and financial 
structure in each country (Lee et al., 2014). 
 
The majority of empirical evidence gathered from various economies in different 
periods endorses a positive influence of diversification on profitability. Baele et al. 
(2007) discovered a correlation between bank franchise value and diversification in 
European banks. Doan et al. (2018) confirmed a favorable relation between 
diversification and performance based on a sample pool of banks from 83 countries 
during the 2003-2012 period.  
 
However, the authors also stated that non-interest income dwindles performance. 
Lee et al. (2014) examined a sample of banks from 29 Asian-Pacific countries 
during 1995-2009 and established that diversification improves bank performance. A 
study by Fang et al. (2011) on banks from 15 transitional economies in Europe 
during 1997-2008 concluded that asset diversification positively, whereas loan 
diversification negatively, correlates with bank performance. Moudud-Ul-Huq et al. 
(2018) investigated banks in ASEAN-5 countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
The Philippines and Vietnam) from 2011 to 2015 and collected evidence of 
enhanced performance and lower risks in diversified banks.  
 
Nevertheless, a handful of empirical studies have determined that diversification 
unfavorably affects bank performance. For instance, research by Berger et al. (2010) 
on a panel of 88 Chinese banks over the period 1996-2006 displayed declining 
performance, in all four aspects: loans, deposits, assets and geographic location, 
along with escalating diversification. Doan et al. (2018) suggested that non-interest 
income share slashes performance. Fang et al. (2011) gathered evidence for a 
negative correlation between debt diversification and bank performance. 
 
While empirical evidence primarily verified a positive effect of diversification on 
bank performance, empirical studies of the connection between diversification and 
banks’ risks yielded mixed results.  
 
Stiroh (2004) was one of the first authors to study the effects of diversification on 
banks’ default risk. The research results on American banking industry suggested 
that non-interest income share increases risks (through Z-score and Sharpe ratio), 
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which is explained by the high correlation between fee income and net interest 
income. Goddard et al. (2008), based on a sample of American credit unions, also 
approved a positive relationship between diversification and risks. Molyneux and 
Yip’s findings (2013) on diversification behavior of banks in Islamic countries 
determined a positive correlation between diversification and default risk, which is 
more clearly manifested in Islamic banks. Lepetit et al. (2008), whose study 
surveyed European banks, concluded that banks extending into non-interest 
activities suffer from higher risks and default risks in comparison with credit-based 
banks. Abuzayed et al. (2018) analyzed a sample of banks in six countries of Gulf 
Cooperation Council from 2001 to 2014 and also drew the same conclusion. 
 
On the other hand, there has been evidence that diversification leads to reduced bank 
risk. Stiroh and Rumble (2006), in their study on diversification of American 
financial holding companies, obtained evidence for a risk-reducing quality of 
diversification. Köhler’s (2014) research on banks in Germany, including savings 
banks, cooperative banks and other banks (retail- and investment-oriented) indicated 
that fee-based services and trading income of most banks (except for investment-
oriented banks) is inversely related to risks. A study by Lee et al. (2014) on banks in 
29 Asian-Pacific countries and a study by Moudud-Ul-Huq et al. (2018) on banks in 
ASEAN-5 countries showing that diversification contributes to risk reduction. 
 
In addition, research by Baele et al. (2007) with a sample of listed European banks 
in the 1989-2004 period found proofs to support a nonlinear relationship between 
risks and diversification. For most banks income diversification reduces 
idiosyncratic risks, but it increases systematic risks. 
 
2.2 The Role of Block Shareholders in the Relationship between Diversification 
and Bank Performance 
 
Corporate governance is a system to ensure effective orientation and operation of the 
company. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that corporate governance can be 
defined as the tool to help maximize return on investment for the company's 
shareholders and creditors. Thus, in theory, corporate governance can help reduce 
agency costs between managers and shareholders and other stakeholders, thereby 
affecting the company’s performance.  
 
Berger et al. (2005) used ownership structure to evaluate corporate governance, 
inheriting the opinion of Shleifer and Vishny (1997), due to poor legal infrastructure 
in protection of the investors. Block shareholders, through their voting rights, are 
able to influence strategic decisions of the board of directors, including decisions on 
diversification, with an aim to maximizing shareholder value. Berger et al. (2005) 
and many other authors (Pennathur et al., 2012; Saghi-Zedec, 2016; Doan et al., 
2018, etc.) categorized major shareholders into three groups: state shareholders, 
private shareholders and foreign shareholders, depending on their distinctive traits. 
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Huibers (2005) stated that in terms of state ownership, every citizen, albeit 
theoretically a holder, has no authority or incentive to supervise banks, which makes 
the government the most effective representative. Any grave agency problem shall 
diminish the performance of state-owned banks. Likewise, Megginson (2005) 
considered state ownership ineffective because it has to balance between social and 
economic goals and is subject to poor supervision and lack of market discipline. 
 
Morck et al. (2000) argued that families and the state regard innovation and 
openness as an insidious threat to their management rights, and thus, are not willing 
to accept financial innovation. Meanwhile, foreign ownership in domestic banks can 
innovate banking services thanks to new technologies and products (Levin, 2001), 
thereby boosting performance. 
 
Bonin et al. (2005) surveyed Eastern European transitional economies and drew the 
conclusion that foreign ownership is of the highest efficiency, followed by private 
ownership, and lastly state ownership, analogous with a study by Berger et al. 
(2005) on the banking sector in Argentina. 
 
In contrast to ample studies on the effects of ownership structure on bank 
performance, research on the influence of block shareholders on banks’ 
diversification decisions remains sparse (Doan et al., 2018). Firstly, Saghi-Zedek 
(2016) investigated whether the presence of a controlling shareholder makes a 
difference in banks’ diversification behavior. From a panel of Western European 
banks in the period 2002-2010 consisting of two groups - diversified and non-
diversified banks, he argued that diversification increases profits and risks.  
 
Furthermore, institutional shareholders increase economies of diversification. Banks 
do not benefit from diversification in the absence of a controlling shareholder, or a 
controlling shareholder as a state shareholder or a family shareholder. Berger et al. 
(2010) compared the diversification behavior of foreign shareholders with domestic 
shareholders (including state and private shareholders). From a sample of Chinese 
banks from 1996 to 2006, the authors discovered that foreign ownership alleviated 
the negative impacts of diversification. Jiang et al. (2013) pursued the same research 
topic with a study on Chinese banks after privatization and attracting foreign 
investors in the late 1990s, thereby confirmed the poor performance of state-owned 
commercial banks - SOCBs), and also approved that IPO increased performance.  
 
Pennathur et al. (2012) studied the influence of block shareholders on the 
relationship between diversification and bank performance in India during the 2001-
2009 period. The authors gathered evidence of increased income diversification 
among banks with state, private and foreign shareholders. Diversification reduces 
the risks among state-owned banks but increases the risks among private and foreign 
banks. Meslier et al. (2014) proved that diversification in the Philippines increased 
profits, but higher in foreign banks. The most recent study by Doan et al. (2018) 
focused on a sample of banks in 83 countries in the period 2003-2012. The authors 
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concluded that income diversification increases performance, and non-interest 
income has reverse impact. In addition, state-owned banks achieved lower efficiency 
in diversification than private banks, albeit with lower diversification costs. Foreign 
ownership achieved lower efficiency in diversification in developed countries, and 
vice versa in developing countries after the global financial crisis. 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
3.1 Research Hypothesis Development 
 
Research hypothesis 1: Diversification affects bank performance, in which it 
increases profits and reduces risks.  
 
The Law on Credit Institutions of Vietnam (2010) requires commercial banks to 
separate securities trading activities from bank traditional operations (including 
deposit-taking, credit provision and payment services). However, banks are allowed 
to establish subsidiaries for securities trading and assets management. Therefore, 
banks’ non-interest income, besides fee-based services, includes income from 
trading and investing activities, which is highly correlated with net interest from 
cross-selling activities. This is extensively substantiated by previous empirical 
evidence, notably by Fang et al. (2011), Lee et al. (2014), Moudud-Ul-Huq et al. 
(2018), Pennathur et al. (2012) for state-owned banks. 
 
Research hypothesis 2: Block shareholders affect bank performance, in which bank 
performance correspondingly decreases in the following order: foreign, private and 
state shareholders. 
 
The Law on Credit Institutions of Vietnam (2010) regulates that individual 
shareholders are not allowed to possess more than 5% of shareholder equity, and 
more than 15% for organizational shareholders, except for state shareholders in 
state-owned banks and foreign shareholders in fully foreign-owned banks. Block 
shareholders exercising their voting rights can appoint their representatives to the 
board of directors and thereby orient banks’ development strategies. Therefore, the 
proposed research hypothesis is that the presence of block shareholders affects bank 
performance. This hypothesis is supported by previous empirical evidence from 
Saghi-Zedek (2016). With a focus on block shareholder groups, the research 
hypothesis pursues the points of view Huibers (2005), Morck et al. (2000) and 
empirical evidence by, inter alia, Bonin et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2005), Jiang et 
al. (2013), Doan et al. (2018). It is argued that bank performance shall gradually 
decrease in the following order: foreign shareholders, private shareholders, and state 
shareholders. 
 
Research hypothesis 3: Block shareholders affect the relationship between 
diversification and bank performance, in which the profits increase and risks are 
reduced.  
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Block shareholders have the power to influence decisions of the board of directors, 
including diversification decisions, with an aim to maximizing benefits for 
shareholders. Saghi-Zedek (2016) claimed that banks do not benefit from 
diversification without a controlling shareholder. Although corporate governance 
regulations in Vietnam have only been in force since 2007, pursuant to the Law on 
Securities of Vietnam, the author expects a positive influence of block shareholders, 
at least for state shareholders and foreign shareholders, on the relationship between 




The research sample was collected from audited annual financial statements of 
Vietnamese commercial banks. The author excluded merged banks and banks 
particularly under the special control of the State Bank of Vietnam (Vietnamese 
central bank) and banks with insufficient data during the study period. The sample 
included 21 banks in the period 2008 -2019; accounting for 60% of the total number 
of banks and 86% of the total assets in the banking system. 
 
3.3 Model Specification and Variables 
 
The research model, derived from Pennathur et al. (2012) and Saghi-Zedek (2016), 
generally formulated as follows: 
 
Bank Performanceit = α + β1(Block shareholders Dummyit) + β2Diversificationit + 
γXit + εit                                                                                                          (1) 
 
Regression equation (1) is used to test research hypotheses 1 and 2. Concerning 
research hypothesis 3, the author followed the idea of Doan et al. (2018), in which 
the authors introduced an interaction variable between block shareholders and 
diversification, forming regression equation (2): 
 
Bank Performanceit = α + β1(Block shareholders Dummyit x Diversificationit) + 
β2Diversificationit + γXit + εit                     (2) 
 
Bank performance measures the bank performance (profitability and risk), Block 
shareholders Dummy includes 3 dummy variables for state, private and foreign 
ownership, Diversification includes variables measuring income diversification and 
non-interest income diversification, X is a set of control variables for the bank (Bank 
size, equity ratio, deposit ratio, loan ratio, asset growth, listing dummy variables) 
and macro environment (GDP growth and inflation). 
 
Dependent variables for bank performance, derived from studies by, inter alia, 
Pennathur et al. (2012), Saghi-Zedek (2016), Moudud-Ul-Huq et al. (2018), denote 
return on total assets (ROA), risk-adjusted return on total assets (RAROA) and 
default risk (ZSCORE). 
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Independent variables for banks’ income diversification include three proxies – non-
interest income share (NIISHARE), derived from studies by Batten and Vo (2016), 
Baele et al. (2007), Doan et al. (2018), etc., income diversification (IDIV), and non-
interest income diversification (NIDIV), derived from studies by Saghi-Zedek 
(2016), Abuzayed et al. (2018) and Doan et al. (2018). 
 
Independent variables for block shareholders include two groups of variables, with 
the first group being the ownership ratio of the state block shareholder (SO), the 
private block shareholder (PO), the foreign block shareholder (FO), derived from the 
measurements of a study by Berger et al. (2010). The second group is the dummy 
variable group regarding control of state shareholders, private shareholders and 
foreign shareholders (DSO10, DPO10, DFO10), with a threshold of 10%, according 
to Pennathur et al. (2012), Jiang et al. (2013), Saghi-Zedek (2016), etc. The author 
decided on ownership threshold of 10% instead of 20% (as found in studies by Doan 
et al., 2018, among others), as the Law on Credit Institutions of Vietnam forbids 
individual shareholders from possessing more than 5% of the shareholder equity and 
organizational shareholders from more than 15% of the shareholder equity, except 
for state shareholders in state-owned banks and foreign shareholders in fully foreign-
owned banks. 
 
Control variables in the model include Bank Size (SIZE), Equity Ratio (EQUITY), 
Deposit Ratio (DEPOSIT), Loan Ratio (LOAN), Asset Growth (GROWTH), 
dummy variables for listed banks (DLIST), GDP growth (GDP) and inflation (INF), 
which have been extensively used in studies on bank performance (Berger et al., 
2010; Fang et al., 2011; Pennathur et al., 2012; Lee et al., 2014; Saghi-Zedek, 2016; 
Abuzayed et al., 2018, etc.). 
 






1 Return on Assets ROA 
Measured as the ratio of profit after tax divided by 
total assets (%) 
2 
Risk-Adjusted 
Return on Assets  
RAROA 
Measured as the ratio of ROA divided by its three-





(ROA + EQUITY)/ σROA, where EQUITY is the 
ratio of shareholder equity scaled by total assets 





IDIV = 1 – [(NII/NOI)2 + (NON/NOI)2] 
Where NII, NON and NOI, respectively, are net 







NIDIV = 1 – [(FEE/NON)2 + (TRADE/NON)2] 
Where FEE is fee income, TRADE is trading income 





Measured as the ratio of non-income interest (NON) 
divided by net operating income (NOI) 
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Source: Own study. 
 
3.4 Data Estimation Methods 
 
According to Campa and Kedia (2002), diversification is endogenous and leads to 
biased data estimates. Based on a study by Abuzayed et al. (2018), by using dynamic 
GMM estimation, the author managed to eliminate endogeneity and violations of 
other regression assumptions. The selection of instrumental variables was performed 
under Saghi-Zedek’s (2016) recommendations, namely lagged values of the 
independent variables and control variables, except for variables for ownership (as 
bank ownership is stabilized over time, as commented by Chi, 2005) and the macro 
environment variables are considered exogenous variables. The validity of the 
instrumental variables was tested by Hansen test, whereas the second-order 
autocorrelation of residuals was examined through Arellano and Bond test (AR2 
test). 
 
4. Research Results and Discussions 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. ROA denotes return on 
total assets. RAROA represents risk-adjusted return on total assets divided by its 
three-year rolling window standard deviation. ZSCORE is the sum of ROA and 
equity to total assets ratio divided by the three-year rolling window standard 
deviation of ROA. SO, FO, DO, respectively, are the ownership ratio of state, 
foreign and private block shareholders. IDIV measures income diversification, 
calculated by 1 – [(NII/NOI)2 + (NON/NOI)2], where NII, NON, and NOI, 
Independent variables for block shareholder ownership 
1 State Ownership SO 
The percentage of bank equity owned by state block 
shareholders  
2 Private Ownership PO 
The percentage of bank equity owned by private 
block shareholders  
3 Foreign Ownership FO 
The percentage of bank equity owned by foreign 





Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the state 





Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the private 





Dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the foreign 
ownership is above the threshold 10%, 0 otherwise 
Control variables 
1 Bank size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets (billion VND) 
2 Equity ratio EQUITY Ratio of shareholder equity to total Assets 
3 Deposit ratio DEPOSIT Ratio of deposit to Total Assets 
4 Loan ratio LOAN Ratio of loan to Total Assets 
5 Asset growth GROWTH Asset annual growth  
6 Listed Dummy  DLIST 
Dummy variable, which takes value 1 for listed banks 
and 0 for unlisted banks 
7 GDP growth GDP GDP annual growth 
8 Inflation INF CPI annual growth  
PHAM Quoc Viet 
 
985  
respectively, are net income interest, non-income interest and net operating income. 
NIDIV measures non-interest income diversification, calculated by 1 – 
[(FEE/NON)2 + (TRADE/NON)2], where FEE is fee income, TRADE is trading 
income and other non-interest income. NIISHARE is the ratio of non-interest 
income divided by net operating income. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets 
(billion VND).  EQUITY is the ratio of shareholder equity divided by total assets. 
DEPOSIT and LOAN are respectively the ratio of deposits and loans to total assets. 
GROWTH measures annual growth in bank assets. GDP and CPI respectively 
measure the annual growth of real GDP and CPI. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Max Min StdDev 
 ROA 304 0.985 0.862 5.952 -5.512 0.779 
 RAROA 266 5.804 3.931 53.294 -1.467 6.736 
 ZSCORE 266 67.917 43.206 737.965 0.322 83.087 
 SO 251 0.274 0.061 1.000 0.000 0.360 
 FO 251 0.067 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.103 
 PO 251 0.060 0.000 0.598 0.000 0.095 
 IDIV 304 0.279 0.312 0.500 -1.667 0.199 
 NIDIV 304 0.076 0.426 0.500 -19.932 1.480 
NIISHARE 304 20.347 19.412 100.000 -54.084 15.121 
 SIZE 304 11.287 11.556 14.214 5.932 1.535 
 EQUITY 304 10.297 8.608 46.245 0.406 6.362 
 DEPOSIT 304 63.017 65.135 89.372 0.000 14.194 
 LOAN 304 55.313 56.884 87.972 11.384 14.163 
 GROWTH 286 0.374 0.185 8.355 -0.392 0.714 
 GDP 304 6.355 6.423 7.547 5.247 0.688 
 INF 304 7.631 6.717 23.115 0.631 5.959 
Source: Own study. 
 
Statistics from Table 2 showed that the average return on total assets of Vietnamese 
banks was 0.985%, with a standard deviation of 0.779%. This is approximately 
equal to Indian banks’ ROA of 0.99% (according to results by Pennathur et al., 
2012) and much higher than that of European banks at 0.519% (according to the 
results by Saghi-Zadek, 2016). In addition, the average default risk measured by 
ZSCORE among Vietnamese banks amounted to 67.917, lower than that of Indian 
banks (102.72), but higher than that of European banks (54.522), respectively from 
results by Pennathur et al. (2012) and by Saghi-Zadek (2016). 
 
Average ownership of state block shareholders reached 27.4%, much higher than 
those of foreign ownership (6.7%) and of domestic private ownership (6%). 
 
The average income diversification of Vietnamese banks was 27.9%, and the 
average non-interest income diversification was 7.6%. The minimum values of 
income diversification and non-interest income diversification were negative (-1,667 
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and -19,932 respectively), resulting from the negative income of either factor. 
Average non-interest income share reached 20.347%. 
 
Table 3. Block shareholders, diversification and bank performance  
 Dependent variables 
 ROA ROA RAROA RAROA ZSCORE ZSCORE 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
L.ROA 0.550*** 0.475***     
 (0.187) (0.158)     
L.RAROA   0.183 0.495   
   (0.410) (0.427)   
L.ZSCORE     0.323*** 0.310*** 
     (0.078) (0.055) 
SO 3.074**  16.619  87.714  
 (1.435)  (10.608)  (76.335)  
FO -2.884  -38.149  -596.565  
 (2.027)  (30.801)  (381.006)  
PO -4.792**  -36.463*  977.202  
 (2.105)  (20.034)  (760.768)  
DSO10  -0.416  12.876**  0.287 
  (0.373)  (5.196)  (76.405) 
DFO10  0.238  -19.344*  -60.909 
  (0.651)  (10.148)  (48.938) 
DPO10  -0.747  -7.348  58.733 
  (0.804)  (4.790)  (59.133) 
IDIV 4.962*** 3.058** 13.117 37.456* 66.538 49.830 
 (1.527) (1.189) (15.130) (22.039) (719.282) (795.020) 
NIDIV 0.173 -0.125 -0.234 -0.410 -55.290 -74.954 
 (0.270) (0.850) (2.841) (3.311) (97.707) (81.681) 
NIISHARE -0.027** -0.029** -0.109 -0.216* -2.712 -2.471 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.117) (0.115) (6.462) (9.668) 
SIZE -0.581** -0.161 -2.313 -2.287 95.248 96.064* 
 (0.289) (0.247) (4.663) (4.850) (86.228) (50.333) 
EQUITY 0.054 -0.024 -0.004 -0.444 9.000 7.543 
 (0.064) (0.054) (1.010) (1.252) (7.541) (7.724) 
DEPOSIT 0.057** -0.008 0.251 0.211 -7.907 -5.935 
 (0.028) (0.013) (0.176) (0.233) (8.126) (9.172) 
LOAN -0.117** -0.008 -0.782*** -1.006*** 1.748 1.189 
 (0.047) (0.037) (0.294) (0.308) (4.546) (5.223) 
GROWTH -0.875 -0.384 -12.804 -29.166** 39.346 18.006 
 (0.578) (1.125) (9.439) (13.766) (61.189) (47.716) 
DLIST 1.377** 0.009 13.134** 13.915*** -91.269 -124.777 
 (0.589) (0.312) (5.771) (4.316) (110.167) (82.340) 
GDP 0.937* -0.045 1.268 8.600** -5.406 6.528 
 (0.482) (0.347) (2.997) (4.209) (36.607) (15.951) 
INF -0.060** -0.016 -0.331 -0.242 -4.849 -0.736 
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 (0.026) (0.036) (0.258) (0.297) (5.900) (6.840) 
Constant 2.972 3.941 51.065 22.414 -600.460 -763.180 
 (4.475) (5.122) (59.975) (64.159) (689.307) (497.095) 
Observations 249 249 241 241 241 241 
Number of 
banks 
21 21 21 21 21 21 
AR2 test (p-
value) 
0.893 0.198 0.754 0.0838 0.727 0.497 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
0.998 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 
Source: Own study. 
 
Table 3 presents the dynamic GMM estimation results. ROA denotes return on total 
assets. RAROA represents risk-adjusted return on total assets divided by its three-
year rolling window standard deviation. ZSCORE is the sum of ROA and equity to 
total assets ratio divided by the three-year rolling window standard deviation of 
ROA. SO, FO, DO, respectively, are the ownership ratio of state, foreign and private 
block shareholders. IDIV measures income diversification, calculated by 1 – 
[(NII/NOI)2 + (NON/NOI)2], where NII, NON, and NOI, respectively, are net 
income interest, non-income interest and net operating income. NIDIV measures 
non-interest income diversification, calculated by 1 – [(FEE/NON)2 + 
(TRADE/NON)2], where FEE is fee income, TRADE is trading income and other 
non-interest income. NIISHARE is the ratio of non-interest income divided by net 
operating income. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets (billion VND).  
EQUITY is the ratio of shareholder equity divided by total assets. DEPOSIT and 
LOAN are respectively the ratio of deposits and loans to total assets. GROWTH 
measures annual growth in bank assets. GDP and CPI respectively measure the 
annual growth of real GDP and CPI. Columms (1), (3) and (5) report the regression 
results where ownership ratios are used, while columms (2), (4) and (6) provide the 
results with dummy variables for block shareholders.  
 
Hansen test is used for testing of the overidentifying restrictions of instruments. AR2 
test is a test of the absence of second-order residual autocorrelation. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Results in Table 3 showed that lagged values of dependent variables had a 
statistically significant positive correlation with the dependent variables; p-value of 
AR2 test and p-value of Hansen test supported the relevance of the employed 
instrumental variable and the absence of second-order residual autocorrelation. 
 
Income diversification (IDIV) affected the bank performance, in which it increased 
the return on total assets (ROA) and risk-adjusted return on total assets (RAROA), 
but it was not statistically significant to default risk (positive correlation existed, but 
did not reach statistical significance level). This result corresponds with previous 
empirical evidence from studies by Fang et al. (2011) on Eastern European banks, 
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by Lee et al. (2014) on Asian-Pacific banks, by Moudud-Ul-Huq et al. (2018) on 
banks in 5 ASEAN countries, and by Pennathur et al. (2012) on a panel of Indian 
banks. 
 
However, the non-interest income share (NIISHARE) negatively impacted bank 
performance, in which it reduced the return on total assets and increased risks (a 
negative correlation with ROA and RAROA existed). This result is consistent with 
empirical evidence from studies by Lepetit et al. (2008) on European banks, Doan et 
al. (2018) on a sample of banks in 83 countries, and by Batten and Vo (2016) on 
Vietnamese banks. 
 
Furthermore, the author found no evidence of the effect of non-interest income 
diversification (NIDIV) on Vietnamese banks’ performance in terms of both returns 
and risks. These research results confirm the author's hypothesis 1, where it is 
supposed that diversification affects bank performance, and in particular increases 
profits and reduces risks. 
 
State ownership increased bank profits and reduced risks, indicating a significant 
positive correlation between ownership ratio and return on total assets and a positive 
correlation between dummy variables for state ownership at 10% and risk-adjusted 
return on total assets. Nonetheless, the author did not find any influence of state 
block shareholders on banks’ risks. What is more, the author obtained evidence for 
the influence of foreign and private block shareholders on increasing banks’ risks, 
which was reflected in a significant negative correlation between ownership 
variables and risk-adjusted return on total assets. Besides, the presence of private 
block shareholder has a negative impact on return on total assets. This result, 
although contrary to author's expectations and previous empirical evidence from 
studies by Bonin et al. (2005), Berger et al. (2005), Jiang et al. (2013) and Doan et 
al. (2018), is consistent with previous results by Pennathur et al. (2012) among 
Indian banks. This result can be explained by the market power of state-owned 
banks in Vietnam: in the period 2009-2018 the total assets of four major state-owned 
commercial banks accounted for more than 50% of the system’s (State Bank of 
Vietnam Annual Reports, 2009-2018), which enabled these banks to "lure" large 
customers, make great and stable profits, and thus, other banks were forced have to 
seek less potential customers and thereby suffered from increased risks and lower 
profit margins. 
 
Aside from independent variables, a number of control variables actually affected 
bank performance. Bank size had a negative effect on return on total assets but 
helped reduce bank default risks. An increase in the deposit ratio positively impacted 
the rate of return on total assets; while the increase in loan ratio might adversely 
impact profits, and increase default risks among Vietnamese banks. Not only did 
bank assets growth did not encourage increasing profits, but vice versa. Listing 
promoted the improvement in bank governance, and thereby an increase in profits 
and reduction of default risks. Among macro factors, GDP growth contributed to 
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increased profits in banks, and inflation vice versa. Next, the author examined the 
influence of block shareholders on the relationship between diversification and bank 
performance in regression equation (2). 
 
Table 4. Block shareholders and diversification – performance relationship 
 Income diversification (IDIV) Non-interest income 
diversification (NIDIV) 








ZSCORE ROA RAROA ZSCORE 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
L.ROA 0.462***   0.167 
  
0.361   
 (0.168)   (0.242) 
  
(0.251)   
L.RAROA 
 























on x DSO10 
5.123 -29.226 -550.178 0.524 14.422 38.037 0.042** 0.884* -4.322 
(3.224) (62.812) (651.531) (0.819) (15.304) (265.279) (0.019) (0.477) (5.060) 
Diversificati
on x DFO10 
-2.031 11.572 -757.661 0.625 -0.042 -27.808 0.026 0.317 -3.045 
(3.145) (28.285) (626.890) (0.651) (12.558) (95.301) (0.035) (0.229) (9.437) 
Diversificati
on x DPO10 
1.698 -11.500 -439.265 -0.704 -3.633 212.844* -0.011 -0.291 -1.942 
(6.917) (25.044) (760.646) (1.107) (12.162) (110.758) (0.015) (0.290) (4.692) 
Diversificati
on 
2.477* -14.678 139.954 -0.102 -3.176 -51.618 -0.009 -0.080 0.608 
 (1.272) (13.899) (251.855) (0.438) (2.847) (86.593) (0.011) (0.095) (1.963) 
SIZE -0.151 -3.175 -3.710 -0.614* -5.604 65.346 0.508* 0.940 -14.945 
 (0.294) (6.961) (80.110) (0.363) (8.298) (41.837) (0.267) (3.531) (69.633) 
EQUITY -0.050 -0.554 5.633 -0.021 -0.558 -0.081 0.118** -0.787 -0.144 
 (0.072) (1.180) (9.746) (0.056) (1.018) (10.568) (0.059) (0.888) (7.444) 
DEPOSIT 0.002 0.101 9.552 0.035 0.526 -6.726 0.000 -0.066 1.816 
 (0.048) (0.397) (7.840) (0.026) (0.325) (8.969) (0.018) (0.212) (7.678) 
LOAN -0.009 0.102 -4.220 -0.024 -0.079 6.384 -0.008 0.122 -1.158 
 (0.050) (0.244) (4.468) (0.032) (0.186) (6.987) (0.016) (0.521) (5.245) 
GROWTH 0.148 -9.535 37.149 0.338 -3.957 -276.787 0.689 2.185 -26.425 
 (0.627) (11.107) (63.995) (0.510) (7.875) (310.442) (0.771) (8.256) (109.237) 
DLIST 0.417 15.336 9.368 1.480** 15.036 -150.136* 0.603 -1.255 25.614 
 (0.528) (11.776) (107.817) (0.613) (14.230) (77.760) (0.471) (4.330) (79.262) 
GDP 0.522 -2.512 33.711 0.510 3.604 -38.174 0.004 -3.828 35.220 
 (0.458) (3.824) (54.937) (0.376) (2.906) (64.056) (0.147) (6.048) (24.125) 
INF 0.058** 0.244 7.824 0.043 0.735 1.349 0.030 -0.032 1.172 
 (0.029) (0.615) (8.458) (0.037) (0.492) (11.882) (0.022) (0.273) (8.171) 
Constant -0.208 47.374 -652.256 3.237 13.763 -261.856 -5.774 30.177 -89.115  
(2.865) (89.625) (813.646) (3.451) (67.704) (332.076) (3.539) (63.981) (1,029.175) 
Observation 249 241 241 249 241 241 249 241 241 
Number of 
banks 
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
AR2 test (p-
value) 
0.643 0.591 0.014 0.737 0.733 0.096 0.411 0.152 0.252 
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
0.999 0.998 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.998 0.997 
Source: Own study.  
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Table 4 presents the dynamic GMM estimation results from the data table. ROA 
denotes return on total assets. RAROA represents risk-adjusted return on total assets 
divided by its three-year rolling window standard deviation. ZSCORE is the sum of 
ROA and equity to total assets ratio divided by the three-year rolling window 
standard deviation of ROA. SO, FO, DO, respectively, are the ownership ratio of 
state, foreign and private block shareholders. IDIV measures income diversification, 
calculated by 1 – [(NII/NOI)2 + (NON/NOI)2], where NII, NON, and NOI, 
respectively, are net income interest, non-income interest and net operating income. 
NIDIV measures non-interest income diversification, calculated by 1 – 
[(FEE/NON)2 + (TRADE/NON)2], where FEE is fee income, TRADE is trading 
income and other non-interest income. NIISHARE is the ratio of non-interest 
income divided by net operating income. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets 
(billion VND).  EQUITY is the ratio of shareholder equity divided by total assets. 
DEPOSIT and LOAN are respectively the ratio of deposits and loans to total assets. 
GROWTH measures annual growth in bank assets. GDP and CPI respectively 
measure the annual growth of real GDP and CPI. 
 
Columms (1), (2) and (3) report the regression results where income diversification 
is used as proxy for diversification, while columms (4), (5) and (6) provide the 
results with non-interest income diversification; and columms (7), (8) and (9) show 
the results with non-interest income share. 
 
Hansen test is used for testing of the overidentifying restrictions of instruments. AR2 
test is a test of the absence of second-order residual autocorrelation. Standard errors 
are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Results in Table 4 suggested that state block shareholders play a role in mitigating 
the negative effects of diversification, as reflected in the significant positive 
correlation between the dummy variable for state block shareholders at the threshold 
of 10% and non-interest income share, where this variable has a negative impact on 
the return to total assets as shown above in Table 3. This result corresponds with 
previous empirical evidence from a study by Pennathur et al. (2012) in India, but 
clashes with evidence from a study by Doan et al. (2018).  
 
Moreover, private block shareholders promote the positive impact of diversification 
on banks’ financial capacity, through a significant positive correlation between the 
dummy variable for private block shareholders at the 10% threshold with ZSCORE, 
however, the results in Table 3 did not indicate any influence of diversification on 
bank default risk. The author did not find any influence of foreign block 
shareholders on the relationship between diversification and performance. Given the 
results, research hypothesis 3 has been confirmed, at least for state block 
shareholders. The research results above can be accounted for by the dominant 
ownership ratio of state shareholders in comparison with that of private or foreign 
block shareholders (as presented in Table 1). Therefore, state shareholders do 
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On the one hand, this research aims to examine the impact of diversification on bank 
performance. On the other hand, it addresses the question of whether block 
shareholders have any influence on the relationship between diversification and bank 
performance. The research results are expected to contribute empirical evidence to 
the literature and shall lay the foundation for policies to develop bank governance 
system in Vietnam. 
 
On the research samples of 21 banks from 2008 to 2019, the author tries to answer 
above questions by  using dynamic GMM estimation where banks revenue and risks 
are considered dependent variables, income diversification, non-interest income 
diversification and non-interest income share as independent variables for 
diversification, ownership ratios and dummy variables for block shareholders as 
independent variables for block shareholders, and the interaction between 
diversification and block shareholders. 
 
Research results showed that diversification, in fact, does impact bank performance, 
in which diversification promotes return on assets and risk-adjusted return on assets, 
whereas non-interest income share has an adverse effect, which is reduced return on 
assets and risk-adjusted return on assets. For block shareholders, empirical findings 
support a positive influence of state block shareholders on return on assets, and vice 
versa for private block shareholders. On the other hand, the role of private and 
foreign block shareholders negatively affects risk-adjusted return, and vice versa for 
state block shareholders. The authors did not identify any empirical evidence for the 
influence of block shareholders on banks’ default risks.  
 
Empirical evidence for the influence of block shareholders on the relationship 
between diversification and bank performance remains scarce. In particular, the 
author only discovered a positive impact of state block shareholders on this 
relationship by alleviating the adverse effects of non-interest income on bank 
performance. Furthermore, diversification for banks with private block shareholders 
helps minimize banks’ default risks. The author did not find any evidence on the 
influence of foreign block shareholders on the relationship between diversification 
and bank performance. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned empirical evidence, the author recommends an easing 
of ownership ratio for foreign and private block shareholders so as to take greater 
advantage of the economies of scale and the economies of information from 
diversification. On the other hand, a disproportionate increase in non-interest income 
share may cause diversification to adversely affect bank performance, which bank 
management should be mindful of. 
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The limitation of this study lies in the fact that the non-linear relation between non-
interest income (from fee-based activities, securities trading, and foreign exchange 
trading) and bank performance remained unexamined. This suggests research topics 
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